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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey period was an active one, with significant decisions in sev-
eral different areas of insurance law. These include:
• Certification by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
the Texas Supreme Court on the extent to which a court can con-
sider extrinsic evidence in determining an insurer’s duty to defend.
• Decisions by a Texas federal court and a state court of appeals hold-
ing that an insured could sustain bad faith claims against an unin-
sured motorist (UIM) insurer, even if the insurer timely pays UIM
benefits after a judgment establishing liability and underinsured
status.
• Two decisions by the Texas Supreme Court holding that an insurer’s
payment of an appraisal award does not exempt it from the require-
ments of Section 542.060(a), the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims
Act (TPPCA).
While the Fifth Circuit’s certified question afforded the Texas Supreme
Court the opportunity to provide some clarity regarding the issue of ex-
trinsic evidence and the duty to defend, the courts’ decisions in the ap-
praisal and UIM context, far from clarifying the issues, appear to have
introduced more uncertainty into how courts should apply Chapters 541
and 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.
II. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
A. WHETHER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING THE DUTY TO DEFEND
To determine whether a liability insurer has a duty to defend its insured
against an underlying lawsuit by a third-party claimant, both state and
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federal courts apply the “eight-corners rule,” which considers only the
policy and the claimant’s pleading.1 While the Texas Supreme Court has
never expressly recognized any exception to this rule permitting the con-
sideration of extrinsic evidence beyond the policy and the pleading, nu-
merous intermediate appellate courts and federal courts have employed
various exceptions to allow such evidence, particularly where the evi-
dence pertains to “coverage only” issues.2 As shown by several decisions
this past year, there continues to be inconsistency among the courts re-
garding whether to recognize, and how to apply, these exceptions.3
Fortunately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted this
inconsistency and decided that the issue should be certified to the Texas
Supreme Court for determination.4 In Richards, the insureds sought cov-
erage under their homeowner’s policy for a suit brought against them
arising out of an ATV accident at their house that resulted in the death of
their minor grandson.5 The insurer sought a declaration that it had no
duty to defend based on two exclusions in the policy and relied on extrin-
sic evidence to show that the child was a resident of the insureds’ house-
hold.6 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas admitted
the extrinsic evidence and granted summary judgment for the insurer.7
The district court reasoned that the policy at issue differed from the typi-
cal policies seen in cases where courts apply the eight-corners rule, which
requires the insurer to defend any suit brought against the insured “even
if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent.”8 Rather,
the policy at issue required the insurer to defend only suits to which the
policy’s coverage applied.9 The district court, relying on its own prior
1. State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 784 F. App’x 247, 250 (5th Cir. 2019).
2. See id. at 251–52.
3. See TIG Ins. Co. v. Woodsboro Farmers Coop., No. 5:18-CV-191, 2019 WL
6002235, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2019) (explaining that “‘fundamental coverage ques-
tion’ is a term of art which encompasses only a few specific inquiries, such as ‘whether a
person has been excluded’” from coverage by name or description or whether the policy
exists, and declining to consider affidavits that did not address a “fundamental coverage
question” or relate to a “readily determined fact”); Hudson Ins. Co. v. Alamo Crude Oil,
LLC, No. SA-19-CV-137-XR, 2019 WL 3322867, at *5–6 (W.D. Tex. July 24, 2019) (consid-
ering stipulated facts in the parties’ Rule 26 report to determine the use of the vehicle at
the time of the accident for purposes of applying the policy’s business-use exclusion, be-
cause the underlying pleading’s conclusory allegations made it impossible to determine
coverage, and the stipulated facts did not overlap with the underlying petition’s merits);
Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Preferred Wright-Way Remodeling & Constr.
LLC, No. 6:18-CV-00161-JDK, 2019 WL 172755, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2019) (declin-
ing to apply coverage-only exception); Tex. Political Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins.
Fund v. Pharr-San Juan-Alamo ISD, No. 13-17-00655-CV, 2019 WL 4678433, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 26, 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (considering extrin-
sic evidence from both the insurer and the insured, including advertisements from a golf
cart manufacturer to determine whether golf carts are “mobile equipment,” reasoning that
such evidence was “immaterial to the merits of the underlying lawsuit.”).
4. Richards, 784 F. App’x at 248.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 248–49.
7. Id. at 249.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 250.
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analysis of this issue in B. Hall Contracting Inc. v. Evanston Insurance
Co., concluded that the eight-corners rule was not applicable, meaning
that the insurer could use extrinsic evidence to supply additional facts
showing there was no coverage.10
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained that it had previously suggested
that if the Texas Supreme Court were to recognize an exception,
it would do so only when it is initially impossible to discern whether
coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evidence
goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage which does not over-
lap with the merits of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts al-
leged in the underlying case.11
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that while it had assumed the viability of
the exception because the Texas Supreme Court has cited it with ap-
proval, the Texas Supreme Court has not expressly adopted or applied
the exception.12 The Fifth Circuit concluded that because there is no con-
trolling case law determining whether there is “a policy-language excep-
tion to the eight-corners rule,” the issue “has been, and will likely
continue to be, the subject of insurance litigation throughout this circuit”
and therefore should be certified to the Texas Supreme Court for deter-
mination.13 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question:
“Is the policy-language exception to the eight-corners rule articulated in
B. Hall Contracting Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D.
Tex. 2006), a permissible exception under Texas law?”14
This certification gave the supreme court the opportunity to provide
much-needed guidance to both insureds and insurers by broadly address-
ing the eight-corners rule and the various exceptions used by the lower
state courts and the federal courts.
As noted, the district court reasoned that the “groundless, false or
fraudulent” policy language creates a duty to defend that is broader than
the duty to indemnify, thus supporting application of the eight-corners
rule.15 Because the policy at issue did not have this language, the district
court found that the policy contractually required the insurer to defend
only those claims covered under the policy, indicating that the scope of
the duty to defend coincides with the scope of the duty to indemnify.16
While some practitioners may argue that the eight-corners rule is built
into Texas jurisprudence, such that this distinction in policy language
should be ignored, the Texas Supreme Court has demonstrated its willing-
10. Id. (referencing B. Hall Contracting, Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 634,
645 (N.D. Tex. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 273 F. App’x 310 (5th Cir. 2008)).
11. Id. at 251 (quoting Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523,
531 (5th Cir. 2004)).
12. Id. at 251–52 (citing GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197
S.W.3d 305, 309–10 (Tex. 2006)).
13. Id. at 253.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 249–50.
16. Id. at 249.
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ness to base decisions strictly upon the language of the insurance con-
tract, rather than idioms, historical assumptions, and industry practice.
For example, in Lamar Homes, the insurer argued that breach of con-
tract claims for faulty workmanship are not covered under commercial
general liability (CGL) policies, because the purpose of such policies is
“to protect the insured from tort liability, not claims of defective perform-
ance under a contract,” and because extending CGL coverage to such
claims would “transform[ ] [a CGL policy] into a performance bond.”17
In rejecting this argument, the Texas Supreme Court emphasized that any
comparison of a CGL policy to a performance bond was “irrelevant” and
the “CGL policy covers what it covers.”18 The supreme court instead fo-
cused solely on the policy language, explaining that the CGL policy
makes no distinction between tort and contract damages, either in the
insuring agreement or in the definitions of “property damage” or “occur-
rence.”19 The supreme court concluded that any “preconceived notion”
limiting CGL coverage to only tort liability “must yield to the policy’s
actual language.”20 Given this admonition from the supreme court, any
preconceived notion that the duty to defend always is broader than the
duty to indemnify and must be determined exclusively based on the eight-
corners rule arguably should yield to the actual language in the policy at
issue in each particular case.
After the end of this Survey period, the supreme court issued its deci-
sion in Richards v. State Farm Lloyds.21 Despite the Fifth Circuit’s discus-
sion of Northfield and express statement that it was “disclaim[ing] any
intention or desire that the Supreme Court of Texas confine its reply to
the precise form or scope of the question certified,”22 the supreme court
declined to broadly address the eight-corners rule and any exceptions and
instead addressed only the narrow certified question.23 The court held
that the “‘policy-language exception’ to the eight-corners rule articulated
by the federal district court in B. Hall Contracting—under which the
eight-corners rule does not apply unless the policy contains a groundless-
claims clause—is not a permissible exception under Texas law.”24 The
court specifically noted that it was expressing no opinion on the exception
allowing for extrinsic evidence on coverage issues that do not overlap
with the merits of the underlying suit and that it was reserving comment
on whether other policy language or other factual scenarios may justify
the use of extrinsic evidence, as “[t]he varied circumstances under which
such arguments for the consideration of evidence may arise are beyond
imagination.”25 Given the limited scope of the supreme court’s Richards
17. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2007).
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id.
21. 597 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. 2020).
22. State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 784 F. App’x 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2019).
23. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 497.
24. Id. at 500.
25. Id.
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decision, this issue will continue to generate coverage litigation and will
be one to watch for during the next Survey period.
III. COURT OF APPEALS PERMITS INSURED TO PURSUE A
STOWERS CLAIM EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
EXCESS JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE INSURED
Presented with an issue of first impression, the Fourth San Antonio
Court of Appeals addressed whether an insured has a viable Stowers
claim against its insurer when the insured pays a portion of the amount to
settle the liability suit against the insured because the insurer refused to
pay the entirety of the settlement amount.26
The insurer initially provided a defense for the insured in the underly-
ing suit; however, after the insurer-appointed counsel failed to designate
any experts, the insured retained her own counsel.27 When the claimant
indicated he would settle for $350,000 but the insurer offered only
$250,000, the insured paid the remaining $100,000 to complete the settle-
ment.28 The insured then sued the insurer for breach of contract and neg-
ligent failure to settle.29 The insurer filed motions to dismiss both claims,
which the trial court denied, and the insurer brought an original proceed-
ing for mandamus relief.30
Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court of appeals explained
that the policy language obligated the insurer only to “settle or defend” a
claim as it considered appropriate and thus did not contractually obligate
the insurer to pay any specific amount towards a settlement.31 The court
concluded that the insurer fulfilled its contractual obligation and that the
breach of contract claim therefore had no basis in law or fact.32 Regard-
ing the Stowers claim, the insurer argued that because the underlying suit
settled, there would never be a final judgment against the insured in ex-
cess of the policy limits, thereby precluding a claim for negligent failure
to settle.33 The court of appeals explained that ‘“[a]n issue of first impres-
sion’” may “‘qualify for mandamus relief when the factual scenario has
never been precisely addressed but the principle of law has been clearly
established.’”34 The court of appeals, however, determined that the legal
principle relied on by the insurer—“that a Stowers claim always requires
26. In re Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-19-00180-CV, 2019 WL 2605630, at *4
(Tex. App.—San Antonio June 26, 2019, orig. proceeding [mand. pending]) (citing G.A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929, holding
approved)).
27. Id. at *1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *1–2.
31. Id. at *3–4.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *5 (quoting In re State ex. rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (orig. proceeding)).
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an excess judgment—is not so clearly established ‘as to be free from
doubt,’” and that the insured’s Stowers claim had not been “clearly re-
jected by Texas law.”35 The court therefore concluded that the insurer
was not entitled to mandamus relief, meaning that the insured was al-
lowed to proceed on her Stowers claim.36
IV. UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A. TWELFTH TYLER COURT OF APPEALS OVERTURNS JUDGMENT FOR
INSURED DUE TO TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO ABATE EXTRA-
CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
The Twelfth Tyler Court of Appeals heard one of the earlier 2019 cases
on UIM coverage, where the insured brought claims for breach of con-
tract, unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and violations of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing regarding the UIM and personal injury protec-
tion (PIP) provisions in her policy.37
Holland was involved in an accident while in a vehicle driven by an-
other person at which time she was covered by a personal auto insurance
policy with American National, which included UIM benefits.38 A year
later, American National consented to Holland’s request to settle with
the other driver’s insurer, but conditioned its approval on the settlement
being within the other driver’s policy limits and that no payments would
be made under the PIP or UIM coverage.39 After settling, Holland
sought payment of full UIM and PIP benefits from American National.40
American National paid Holland for the full PIP benefits.41 Holland later
sued American National for breach of contract under the policy’s UIM
provision for Texas Insurance Code violations.42 American National’s
motion to sever and abate was not heard until after voir dire and was
denied.43
The jury found Holland suffered damages in excess of the $100,000
UIM limit and “that American National engaged in an unfair or decep-
tive act or practice and violated [its] duty of good faith and fair dealing”
and that it acted “knowingly.”44 American National appealed.
American National argued it was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure
to sever and abate Holland’s extra-contractual claims, noting that Hol-
land’s introduction of evidence pertaining to her extra-contractual claims
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Am. Nat’l Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holland, No. 12-18-00141-CV, 2019 WL
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ultimately led to the inflation of her UIM damages award.45 Texas courts
routinely hold that insureds’ extra-contractual claims, which are separate
and distinct from their breach of contract claims, should be severed and
abated from the breach of contract claims.46 This is because, as the Texas
Supreme Court held in Brainard, an insurer is under no contractual duty
to pay UIM benefits until an insured proves (1) there is UIM coverage;
(2) the other driver was negligent in causing the accident and damages;
(3) the total amount of the insured’s damages; and (4) that the other
driver’s insurance coverage is deficient in that case.47
Holland responded by arguing that American National had waived its
motion to sever and abate by not presenting it until voir dire had fin-
ished.48 The court of appeals rejected the waiver argument, finding that
Rule 41 permits a party to bring such a motion at any time before the
case has been submitted to the jury.49 Finding no waiver, the court ad-
dressed American National’s argument that it was prejudiced by the fail-
ure to sever.50
At trial, Holland testified about the financial hardship and aggravation
she experienced because her UIM benefits were not paid, testimony that
would not have been admissible in an ordinary UIM claim case.51 Finding
that the extra-contractual claims were therefore used to prejudice the
jury, resulting in an inflated award, the court of appeals sustained Ameri-
can National’s first issue.52
The court of appeals next addressed whether American National had
engaged in deceptive or unfair acts or practices and had violated its duty
of good faith and fair dealing.53 Holland alleged that American National
had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and Section
541.060(a)(2)(B) of the Texas Insurance Code, by (1) “fail[ing] to timely
pay her PIP benefits”; and (2) conditioning its consent “to settle on Hol-
land’s waiving her PIP and UIM benefits.”54
Rejecting the first argument, the court of appeals noted that the evi-
dence showed that Holland requested PIP benefits on November 3, 2016,
and that American National paid them in full in December 2016.55 Addi-
45. Id. at *3.
46. Id. at *2 (citing In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 209 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding)).
47. Id. at *3 (citing Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex.
2006)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Arlitt v. Weston, No. 04-98-00035-CV, 1999 WL 1097101, at *4 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Dec. 1, 1999, pet. denied)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at *4–5.
52. Id. at *6.
53. Id. (noting that even though it sustained American National’s first issue, it ad-
dressed the legal sufficiency argument because if sustained, it would be bound to reverse
and render).
54. Id. at *7.
55. Id.
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tionally, the jury found no delay in payment.56
Addressing the second argument, the court of appeals noted that, at
the time Holland’s counsel requested permission to settle, no settlement
offer had been made, and Holland had represented she did not intend to
seek PIP or UIM benefits.57 The purpose of a consent to settle letter is to
protect the insurer’s subrogation rights; therefore, the letter did not mis-
represent the insured’s rights or policy provisions and, in this context, did
not constitute an unfair settlement practice.58 Because, at the time of the
June 2016 letter, American National had no duty to pay or settle, it could
not have engaged in an unfair or deceptive settlement practice or violated
its duty of good faith and fair dealing.59 Additionally, the letter did not
prevent Holland from later pursuing her PIP and UIM benefits.60 The
court reversed and remanded the contractual UIM claim for a new trial
and reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment in favor of American
National on the claims of deceptive or unfair act or practice and any vio-
lation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.61
B. TEXAS COURTS HOLD THAT UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
ACT IS A PROPER AVENUE FOR LITIGATING UIM CLAIMS
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Irwin, the Fourth San Antonio Court of
Appeals upheld a trial court judgment awarding attorney’s fees in a UIM
case under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA).62 The in-
sured sought a judicial declaration that he was entitled to recover dam-
ages under his UIM policy after a car wreck.63
Allstate argued that the UDJA is not a proper cause of action for re-
covery of UIM benefits, while the insured argued “that nothing in Brai-
nard precludes the use of the UDJA” to establish a UIM claim.64 The
court of appeals, citing an earlier Texarkana decision (which it noted was
the only other Texas case to address the issue), held that the UDJA is a
proper avenue for litigating UIM claims.65 The court emphasized the pur-
pose of the UDJA, which is to allow a person “whose rights, status, or




59. Id. at *7–8
60. See id. at *7.
61. Id. at *8; see also In re Colonial Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-19-00391-CV, 2019 WL
5699735, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] Nov. 05, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.). The First Houston Court of Appeals determined that the severed extra-contractual
claims were “not yet ripe and could be rendered moot by the underlying liability determi-
nation” regarding “the breach of contract case”; thus, the trial court was required to sever
and “abate the statutory extra-contractual claims.” Id.
62. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Irwin, No. 04-18-00293-CV, 2019 WL 3937281, at *1 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. filed).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *3 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 503 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tex. App.—Texar-
kana 2016, no pet.)).
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of their rights under the contract.66 The court noted that “[t]his is exactly
the type of ‘relief from uncertainty’ the UDJA was designed to pro-
vide.”67 The court therefore held that Irwin may use the UDJA to estab-
lish the prerequisites to recovery in his UIM claim.68
Allstate then relied on Brainard to argue that Irwin was not entitled to
attorney’s fees, stating that Irwin’s declaratory judgment action was
“nothing more than a[n] . . . attempt to find a basis for recovering attor-
ney’s fees” when there actually is no basis.69 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, noting that “nothing in the UDJA requires a matured breach of
contract claim,” and therefore held that attorney’s fees were recoverable
under the UDJA for UIM claims.70
The court of appeals’ ruling in Irwin is consistent with Brainard, which
does not limit the method for establishing a UIM claim to a judgment
against the tortfeasor. As the Irwin court pointed out, these types of
claims are exactly the types of claims that are appropriate for declaratory
relief. Additionally, because the UDJA statute allows a court to award
attorney’s fees, the court’s fee award also appears appropriate.
In a similar case, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas in Green v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. took the reason-
ing employed by Irwin a step further.71 In Green, the insured alleged an-
other driver had negligently caused a motor vehicle accident and sought
declaratory judgment under the UDJA on the underinsured motorist’s
negligence, her rights and duties under the policy, and a valuation of the
incurred damages.72 Green also alleged claims against Allstate, including
breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and statutory
violations of Chapters 541 and 542.73
Allstate argued that the breach of contract claim should be dismissed
because there was no judgment establishing liability and damages.74 The
district court found that, while an insurer’s duty does not arise until the
liability of the third party and damages are determined, “an insured can
litigate the issue of UIM coverage with the insurer without first obtaining
a judgment against the tortfeasor.”75 The court noted that “[h]ow the is-
sue of UIM coverage is litigated is unsettled, however.”76 Because Brai-
nard did not clarify what causes of action should be brought to address
the liability and damages issues, the district court held that the insured
66. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a)).
67. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at *4 (citing Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex.
2006)).
70. Id.
71. Green v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. SA-19-CV-360-XR, 2019 WL 2744183,
at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2019).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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could proceed under both the UDJA and a breach of contract theory to
establish the required underlying tort elements.77
In response to Allstate’s argument that Green’s claims for bad faith
should be dismissed because Green failed to state a claim for relief, the
district court instead held that the extra-contractual claims should instead
be abated “pending resolution of the underlying UIM claim.”78
In Green, as in Irwin, the district court appropriately held that an in-
sured could use the UDJA to litigate its UIM claim.79 However, noting
concerns with the statute of limitations, the Green court also allowed the
insured’s breach of contract claim to proceed, despite the fact that the
insured had not established the insurer’s liability on the contract.80 Pre-
sumably because it did not dismiss the breach of contract claim, the court
also refused to dismiss the extra-contractual claims, abating them in-
stead.81 It is not clear from the opinion on what basis the insurer could be
found to have breached the contract given the fact that its contractual
obligation to pay had not yet been triggered under Brainard. Likewise, if
the insurer’s contractual obligation to pay had not yet been triggered,
dismissal, rather than abatement, of the extra-contractual claims may
have been proper.
C. SAN ANTONIO COURTS HOLD THAT WAITING TO PAY A UIM
CLAIM UNTIL AFTER THE JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING LIABILITY
AND UNINSURED STATUS DOES NOT INSULATE AN INSURER
FROM POTENTIAL BAD FAITH LIABILITY
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in San
Antonio and the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals both held that,
notwithstanding Brainard, a UIM insurer could be liable for bad faith for
failing to pay a claim when liability became “reasonably clear” before the
insured obtained a judgment establishing liability and uninsured status.82
In Trejo v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., the U.S District
Court for the Western District of Texas addressed an insured’s bad faith
claims in the UIM context.83 After being involved in a three-vehicle acci-
dent, Velma “Trejo filed a claim for UIM benefits with Allstate . . . which
was denied.”84 Trejo filed suit against Allstate and the claims adjuster,
Tonja Hess, asserting contractual and extra-contractual causes of action.85
Allstate argued that Trejo “failed to state a bad-faith claim against
Hess because she ha[d] not obtained a judgment establishing the liability




81. Id. at *4.
82. See Trejo v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. SA-19-CV-00180-FB-ESC, 2019 WL
4545614, at *8–9 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2019); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ass’n v. Cook, 591
S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.).
83. Trejo, 2019 WL 4545614, at *1.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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and underinsured status of the other motorist.”86 The district court noted,
however, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had rejected
this argument in Hamburger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.87 There, the Fifth Circuit noted that if bad faith claims are available
only after an insured’s legal entitlement to recovery is established, an in-
sured “could never successfully assert a bad faith claim against his insurer
for failing to attempt a fair settlement of a UIM claim,” because an in-
surer’s common law and statutory duties of good faith and fair dealing do
not extend beyond the entry of judgment in favor of the insured.88
The district court attempted to reconcile Hamburger with Brainard,
noting that “Hamburger was decided two years before Brainard,” which
did not “address or call into doubt Hamburger’s holding.”89 Rather, con-
struing the phrase “legally entitled to recover,” “Brainard held only that
a plaintiff may not be awarded pre-judgment interest on a breach-of-con-
tract claim against her insurer for failure to pay benefits before securing a
judgment establishing . . . liability.”90 Conversely, “to prevail on a bad-
faith claim, a plaintiff need demonstrate only that an insurer wrongfully
withheld payment” when its “obligation to pay was ‘reasonably clear.’”91
Because the standards for “legally entitled to recover” and “reasonably
clear” are different, the district court found that Brainard did not over-
rule Hamburger.92 Thus, while a judgment against the tortfeasor is neces-
sary to trigger the insurer’s contractual obligation to pay, liability under
the insurance code requires that a plaintiff show the UIM payment was
wrongfully withheld when the obligation to pay becomes reasonably
clear.93
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed similar issues in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Association v. Cook.94 There, the insured
brought a negligence action against the other driver, and asserted breach
of contract, extra-contractual bad faith, and TPPCA claims against an in-
surer for failing to pay the full policy limit for UIM benefits.95 After a
judgment against State Farm awarding policy limits, State Farm paid the
judgment and moved to dismiss the extra-contractual claims which had
been severed and abated.96 The court of appeals denied the motion, but
allowed a permissive appeal of the following two controlling questions,
starting with the Brainard proposition that a UIM insurer “is under no
86. Id. at *7.
87. Id. (citing Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875, 880–81 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
88. Hamburger, 361 F.3d at 880–81 (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Boyte, 80
S.W.3d 546, 549 (Tex. 2002)) (explaining that, after judgment, “there are no longer duties
of good faith and the relationship becomes one of judgment debtor and creditor.”).
89. Trejo, 2019 WL 4545614, at *8.




94. 591 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.).
95. Id. at 679.
96. Id.
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contractual duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a judgment es-
tablishing the liability and underinsured status of the other motorist”:97
[1] Can a[n] UM insured nonetheless sustain a common law or statu-
tory bad faith claim against a[n] UM insurer that withholds payment
of UM benefits until such a judgment is obtained? [2] Can a[n] UM
insured sustain a prompt payment claim against a[n] UM insurer that
timely pays UM benefits after such a judgment is obtained?98
The court of appeals held the answer to question (1) is “yes” and to ques-
tion (2) is “no.”99
Regarding the bad faith claims, State Farm argued that an insurer’s
liability cannot be “reasonably clear” until a judgment establishes the
other driver’s negligence and uninsured status, and, until such judgment
is entered, an insurer has a reasonable basis for delaying payment.100 Cit-
ing Hamburger and federal cases following Hamburger, the court of ap-
peals disagreed that “such a holding flows from the analysis and holding
in Brainard.”101 Rather, referring back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit’s statement in Hamburger that no Texas cases have “held
that liability can never be reasonably clear before there is a court deter-
mination of proximately caused damages,” the court of appeals found it
possible that liability under a UIM policy can be reasonably clear before
legal entitlement to the benefits is established.102 Citing Accardo, the
court further explained the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning as follows:
In Hamburger, the Fifth Circuit implicitly recognized that there may
be cases in which an insurer’s liability to pay UM/UIM benefits is
reasonably clear despite the fact that no judicial determination of the
UM/UIM’s liability has been made. When a reasonable investigation
reveals overwhelming evidence of the UM/UIM’s fault, the judicial
determination that triggers the insurer’s obligation to pay is no more
than a formality. In such cases, an insurer may act in bad faith by
delaying payment and insisting that the insured litigate liability and
damages before paying benefits on a claim.103
The court followed the reasoning in Hamburger, holding that insurers
may still “act in bad faith by failing to reasonably investigate or delaying
payment on” a UIM claim until after the insured has obtained judgment
establishing the other motorist’s liability and uninsured status.104
Regarding the second question, the court of appeals held that, on the
other hand, Cook could not sustain a prompt payment claim after State
97. Id. at 680 (citing Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex.
2006)).
98. Id. (citing Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818).
99. Id. at 679.
100. Id. at 681.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875, 880–81
(5th Cir. 2004)).
103. Id. at 682 (quoting Accardo v. Am. First Lloyds Ins. Co., No. H-11-0008, 2012 WL
1576022, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2012)).
104. Id. at 683.
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Farm timely paid the claim nine days after the trial court’s judgment es-
tablishing the other driver’s liability and uninsured status, because the
insurer’s liability does not arise until the date of the judgment.105 “When
an insurer promptly pays a [UIM] claim after the date the trial court en-
ters such a judgment, the insurer does not violate the Code’s prompt pay-
ment provisions.”106
The court of appeals’ ruling that an insurer could be subject to bad
faith liability for waiting to pay until a judgment established liability,
based on its attempt to distinguish liability being “reasonably clear” from
an insured’s being “legally entitled to recover,” appears inconsistent with
both Brainard and USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca,107 as it effec-
tively imposes a tort duty on an insurer to pay a claim prior to a time
when the insurer is contractually obligated to pay, before the process for
determining liability and damages has been completed.108 We note that
the ruling also appears inconsistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Ortiz v. State Farm, where the supreme court, in an analogous
situation, held that an insurer which follows the appraisal process and
pays the appraisal award cannot be found liable for bad faith in the ab-
sence of actual damages other than the policy benefits.109 The rulings in
Trejo and Cook could possibly be reconciled with Ortiz to the extent that
the courts acknowledged that, under Menchaca, a bad faith finding is pos-
sible if the insurer’s violation causes damages independent from the loss
of the benefits.110 However, the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals’
opinion in Cook is not so limited and does not mention Menchaca.111 The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in Trejo, conversely,
expressly overruled Allstate’s reliance on Menchaca on the basis that
“Trejo’s bad-faith claims against Hess are not premised on an indepen-
dent-injury theory.”112 The district court further noted that Menchaca did
not “discuss § 541.060 claims containing the phrase ‘reasonably clear.’”113
It is difficult to see how these courts’ findings that an insurer can be sub-
ject to bad faith if it fails to pay once liability is “reasonably clear.”
Before an insurer is contractually obligated to pay, it should align with
Menchaca’s conclusion that an insurer is not liable for extra-contractual
liability in the absence of evidence of actual damages other than the pol-
icy limits.
105. Id. at 684.
106. Id.
107. 545 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. 2018).
108. See id. at 489; Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex.
2006).
109. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019); see discussion infra Part
V.B.
110. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499.
111. See Cook, 591 S.W.3d at 678–684.
112. Trejo v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. SA-19-CV-00180-FB-ESC, 2019 WL
4545614, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2019).
113. Id.
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V. APPRAISAL
As the Texas Supreme Court has recognized, “appraisal clauses are in-
cluded in most property insurance policies” because, in every property
damage claim, someone must define the amount of loss the insurer
should pay.114 “Appraisal clauses are a means of determining the amount
of loss and resolving disputes about the amount of loss for a covered
claim.”115 Parties generally resort to appraisal when they “reach an im-
passe,” or “mutual understanding that neither will negotiate further,” and
both “are aware of the futility of further negotiations.”116
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT AN INSURER’S
PAYMENT OF APPRAISAL AWARDS DOES NOT EXEMPT IT
FROM THE TPPCA STATUTORY DEADLINES
In June 2019, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether an insured
might prevail on a claim for damages under the TPPCA for delayed pay-
ment when the insurer invoked the policy’s appraisal process provision
and paid the insured the appraisal amount.117 In Barbara Technologies
Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, State Farm Lloyds (State Farm) issued a
property insurance policy to Barbara Technologies Corporation (Barbara
Tech).118 Barbara Tech filed a claim with State Farm on October 17, 2013,
after the property sustained wind and hail damage.119 After an initial in-
vestigation, State Farm denied coverage, finding that the property sus-
tained damages worth less than the policy deductible.120 Barbara Tech
requested a second inspection, and State Farm rejected the claim again,
finding no additional damage.121
Barbara Tech filed suit alleging, among other things, TPPCA viola-
tions.122 Following State Farm’s invocation of the appraisal provision,
“the appraisers agreed to a[ ] . . . value of $193,345.63,” and after sub-
tracting depreciation and the deductible, State Farm paid $178,845.25
four business days later.123 Barbara Tech “accepted the payment and
amended its petition to include only claims for violations of . . . [C]hapter
542 for State Farm’s alleged failure to comply with statutory
deadlines.”124
On cross-motions for summary judgment, Barbara Tech argued State
Farm had violated the TPPCA for “failing to pay the claim within the
114. Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Tex. 2019).
115. Id.
116. See Miranda v. Tex. Lloyds Allstate, 2019 WL 6208563, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21,
2019) (citing In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 409–10 (Tex.
2009)).






123. Id. at 809–810.
124. Id. at 810.
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TPPCA’s sixty-day time limit,” and State Farm asserted that its timely
payment of the appraisal award foreclosed TPPCA damages as a matter
of law.125 The trial court agreed with State Farm, granting summary judg-
ment in its favor, and the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals af-
firmed.126 On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court framed the issue before it
as follows: “whether an insured’s claim for prompt pay damages under
the TPPCA survives the insurer’s payment in full after the amount of loss
was determined through an appraisal process provided for in the parties’
insurance policy.”127
The supreme court began by discussing the purpose of Chapter 542,
which “relates specifically to prompt payment of claims,” but also to “re-
quirements and deadlines for responding to, investigating, and evaluating
insurance claims.”128 The supreme court noted that damages can be im-
posed for violations of both payment and non-payment deadlines.129 Re-
garding the non-payment deadlines, “TPPCA deadlines are triggered
when ‘the insurer receives all items, statements, and forms required . . . to
secure final proof of loss.’”130 If an insurer delays a payment for more
than sixty days, it is subject to damages of 18% interest per year, plus
attorney’s fees, as provided in Section 542.060.131 According to the su-
preme court, “the TPPCA has three main components—non-payment re-
quirements and deadlines, deadlines for paying claims, and
enforcement”—the latter two being “at issue here.”132
“Barbara Tech argue[d] that although State Farm paid the appraisal
value, . . . [it] owes damages under the TPPCA because it delayed pay-
ment of the claim beyond the applicable [sixty-day] statutory period.”133
State Farm argued that its initiation of the contractual appraisal process
amounted to a request for additional information and extended the dead-
line to accept or reject a claim, and that its time for acceptance or rejec-
tion began when it received the appraisal award.134 Because it paid four
business days later, its payment was timely.135
The supreme court rejected State Farm’s argument for two reasons.
First, “State Farm’s appraisal demand was based on its contractual right
to . . . [the] dispute resolution process” rather than “a request for items,
statements, or forms from Barbara Tech to secure final proof of loss”;
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 810–811.
128. Id. at 812.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 28 (Tex.
2007)) (“Additional TPPCA deadlines are triggered when ‘the insurer receives all items,
statements, and forms required . . . to secure final proof of loss,’ whether the insurer re-
ceives this information in response to its initial request or in response to additional
requests.”).
131. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060).
132. Id. at 813.
133. Id. at 815.
134. Id. at 816.
135. Id.
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thus, “State’s Farm’s use of the appraisal process [fell] outside the scope
of 542.055.”136 Second, an insurer’s rejection or acceptance of a claim
under Section 546.056(a) is an acknowledgement that the insurer had all
the information necessary to determine the insured’s entitlement to pol-
icy benefits.137 Because “rejection of a claim is based on all information
the insurer deemed necessary” the appraisal process is not part of the
investigation nor does it start the investigation all over again.138 An in-
surer’s rejection of the claim thus indicates an investigative conclusion
that no benefits under the policy are owed, that it is not liable for the
claim, and that no additional information is necessary.139 For these rea-
sons, the supreme court concluded that the initiation of the appraisal pro-
cess was not a request for information under the statute.140
The supreme court next determined that “nothing in the TPPCA ex-
empts appraisal payments from the TPPCA’s payment deadlines or en-
forcement.”141 The supreme court addressed the courts of appeals’
opinions on which State Farm relied, which held that “use of the appraisal
process to fully resolve a dispute as to the amount” of the loss, if any,
precludes TPPCA damages, and cautioned that
to the extent these opinions could be read to excuse an insurer liable
under the policy from having to pay TPPCA damages merely be-
cause it tendered payment based on an appraisal award, or to fore-
close any further proceedings to determine the insurer’s liability
under the policy, we disapprove of these opinions.142
Per the terms of the statute, where an insurer is “liable” under the policy
and delays payment beyond the statutory deadlines, even if it utilizes the
appraisal process, it will be subject to liability for TPPCA damages.143
Until the insurer is determined to be liable—“either by accepting the
claim and notifying the insured that it will pay, or through an adjudication
of liability—the insurer is required to pay nothing, is subject to no pay-
ment deadline, and is not subject to TPPCA damages for delayed
payment.”144
Here, State Farm initially denied the claim and thus did not acknowl-
edge liability.145 Further, State Farm’s initiation of the appraisal process
represented a willingness to resolve a dispute outside of court—akin to a
settlement—and did not constitute an acknowledgment of liability.146 As
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 816–17.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 817.
141. Id. at 817, 822 (“To be clear, nothing in the TPPCA suggests that the invocation of
a contractual appraisal provision alters or suspends any TPPCA requirements or
deadlines.”).
142. Id. at 819 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.058, 542.060).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 822 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060(a)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 822–23.
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such, the supreme court held that a payment pursuant to appraisal is not
an acknowledgment of liability.147 Thus, State Farm’s liability, and Bar-
bara Tech’s entitlement to damages under the statute, was not estab-
lished, and TPPCA damages were not necessarily triggered.148
The supreme court cautioned that it was not suggesting that rejected
claims may never trigger TPPCA damages, or that an insurer could avoid
TPPCA damages by “simply deny[ing] claims . . . and pay[ing] them
later.”149 Rather, if an insurer has complied “with the TPPCA in respond-
ing to the claim, requesting necessary information, investigating, evaluat-
ing, and reaching a decision . . . [the] use of the contract’s appraisal
process does not vitiate the insurer’s earlier determination on the
claim.”150 The supreme court concluded that “payment of an appraisal
award on a rejected claim does not subject the insurer to prompt pay
damages under [S]ection 542.060 unless and until the insurer either ac-
cepts liability under the policy or is adjudicated liable.”151 Because State
Farm did not conclusively establish it was not liable, it was not entitled to
summary judgment.152
“Barbara Tech further argue[d] that the appraisal value constituted an
award of actual damages,” and that pursuant to Menchaca, “it could re-
cover those benefits as ‘actual damages,’ because State Farm’s wrongful
denial of [its] valid claim caused the loss of those benefits.”153 By exten-
sion, if “policy benefits can be actual damages for the purpose of deter-
mining the availability of statutory and other extra-contractual damages,
they can also be actual damages . . . under the TPPCA.”154 The supreme
court disagreed, holding that, consistent with its reasoning above, the
amount of the award did not constitute “actual damages” because State
Farm had neither accepted liability nor been adjudicated liable.155 Con-
cluding that neither party met its burden of establishing entitlement to
summary judgment, the supreme court remanded the case for further
proceedings regarding State Farm’s “liability.”156




151. Id. at 825.
152. Id. at 828.
153. Id. at 826 (quoting USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 495 (Tex.
2018)) (“[A]n insured who establishes a right to receive benefits under an insurance policy
can recover those benefits as ‘actual damages’ under [the Insurance Code] if the insurer’s
statutory violation causes the loss of the benefits.”).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 826–27.
156. Id. at 828.
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B. CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH BARBARA TECHS., THE TEXAS
SUPREME COURT HELD THAT, ALTHOUGH AN INSURER’S
PAYMENT OF AN APPRAISAL AWARD DOES NOT INSULATE IT
FROM TPPCA DAMAGES, IT PRECLUDES CLAIMS FOR BREACH
OF CONTRACT AND BAD FAITH
In a decision issued the same day as Barbara Techs., the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed “the effect of an insurer’s payment of an ap-
praisal award on an insured’s claims for breach of contract, bad faith
insurance practices, and violations of the [TPPCA].”157
Ortiz submitted a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy for
wind and hail damage to his house.158 After State Farm’s first adjuster
found damage related to the wind and hail that fell below the policy’s
$1,000 deductible, Ortiz had a public adjuster estimate the damage, re-
sulting in an estimate of $23,525.99.159 “State Farm conducted a second
inspection with the public adjuster present and revised” its initial esti-
mate up, although still below the policy deductible.160 Ortiz sued for
breach of contract, violation of the TPPCA, and statutory and common
law bad faith insurance practices.161 State Farm’s answer two months
later included a demand for appraisal pursuant to the policy language.162
State Farm paid Ortiz seven business days after receiving the appraisal
award.163 State Farm was subsequently granted summary judgment on
the basis that the appraisal award payment resolved and disposed of all
claims in the lawsuit.164 The court of appeals affirmed.165
1. Breach of Contract
Ortiz argued that if an appraisal award is higher than the estimate of-
fered by the insurer, the insurer necessarily breached the policy, and thus
State Farm breached the policy.166 The supreme court, however, agreed
with Texas courts of appeals that “have unanimously rejected this argu-
ment and held that an insurer’s payment of an appraisal award in the face
of similar allegations of pre-appraisal underpayment forecloses liability
on a breach of contract claim.”167 According to the court, “appraisal
awards do not serve to establish a party’s liability (or lack thereof),”
rather, they resolve the dispute among insurers and insureds as to the
amount of the covered loss, and are thus binding on the parties.168




161. Id. at 129–30.
162. Id. at 130.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 130–131.
165. Id. at 130.
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It simply does not follow that an appraisal award demonstrates that
an insurer breached by failing to pay the covered loss. If it did, in-
sureds would be incentivized to sue for breach every time an ap-
praisal yields a higher amount than the insurer’s estimate . . . thereby
encouraging litigation rather than “short-circuit[ing]” it as
intended.169
The supreme court also addressed the significance of “the contractual
nature of the appraisal process,” pointing out that State Farm “invoked
the . . . procedure for determining the amount of loss, and . . . paid [the]
binding amount, [thereby] comply[ing] with its obligations under the pol-
icy.”170 For these reasons, the supreme court affirmed summary judgment
for State Farm on the breach of contract claim.171
2. Bad Faith
Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code “authorizes a private action against
an insurer” when the insurer has committed “an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in the business of insurance.”172 Ortiz alleged State Farm
“wrongfully den[ied] his claim, fail[ed] to settle the claim in good faith,
and fail[ed] to conduct a reasonable investigation,” in violation of the
statute, and that State Farm violated its common law duty of good faith
and fair dealing.173 Ortiz argued “the discrepancy between State Farm’s
estimate and the [final] appraisal award constituted evidence that State
Farm intentionally undervalued the claim,” and that he was “entitled to
recover the ‘fees and expenses’” he incurred to pursue his benefits under
the policy as a result of “State Farm’s unreasonable investigation of his
claim.”174
The supreme court ruled that Ortiz’s attorney’s fees and costs did not
constitute “actual damages,” and that the “law is clear that attorney’s fees
and costs incurred in the prosecution or defense of a claim, although
‘compensatory in that they help make a claimant whole,’ are not dam-
ages.”175 The supreme court reiterated that the legislature made clear in
Chapter 541 that a claimant must “prevail on the underlying claim and
recover damages in order to recover attorney’s fees.”176 As such, the su-
preme court held that “[b]ecause Ortiz [sought] no actual damages other
than the policy benefits . . . he [could] not maintain a bad faith claim
under either common law or [C]hapter 541.”177
169. Id. at 132–33 (citing In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404,
412 (Tex. 2011)).
170. Id. at 133.
171. Id. (referencing Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
172. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151).
173. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.060(a)(2)–(4), 541.060(a)(7)).
174. Id. at 133–134.
175. Id. at 135.
176. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.152(a)(1)).
177. Id.
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3. Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act
The supreme court next addressed “whether State Farm’s payment of
the appraisal award foreclose[d] Ortiz’s recovery under” the TPPCA.178
Citing its decision in Barbara Techs., the supreme court noted that the
TPPCA “imposes procedural requirements and deadlines on insurance
companies to promote the prompt payment of insurance claims.”179 Al-
though the lower courts had concluded the payment of the appraisal
award foreclosed recovery under the TPPCA, the supreme court reversed
and remanded the TPPCA claims in light of its contemporaneous deci-
sion in Barbara Techs., which held that “payment of an appraisal award
does not as a matter of law bar an insured’s claims under the
[TPPCA].”180 The supreme court therefore held that, like the insured in
Barbara Techs., Ortiz was entitled to proceed on his TPPCA claim de-
spite State Farm having paid the appraisal award.181
While Barbara Techs. and Ortiz clarify that, under Texas law, an in-
surer which pays an appraisal award will not be subject to liability for
breach of contract or for extra-contractual liability in the absence of evi-
dence of actual damages other than the policy benefits, the supreme court
for the first time held that an insurer that pays an appraisal award is not
exempt from the requirements of the TPPCA.182 Thus, an insurer can be
subject to Chapter 542 penalties if it is found liable for the claim and to
have delayed payment beyond the statutory deadlines.183 These decisions,
however, raise significant questions. Noticeably absent in the supreme
court’s lengthy analyses (and that of the dissent in Barbara Techs.) is a
discussion of how damages are to be calculated on remand. If the amount
of the appraisal award is not the “actual damages,” as the supreme court
concluded, will the parties be required to present evidence of the actual
amount of the loss? Will the amount of the loss be capped at the amount
of the appraisal award? Additional litigation over these issues seems in-
consistent with the purpose of the appraisal provisions. The supreme
court seemed to suggest that the issue is one that perhaps should be ad-
dressed by the legislature, which it opined was well-aware of appraisals
but did not address them in the statute.184 Pursuant to these decisions, the
appraisal process—one which was meant to provide a final resolution for
disputed claims—no longer provides such finality.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.054).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 135–36.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 806, 815–16 (Tex.
2019).
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C. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT HOLDS THE MAINALI
“REASONABLENESS” STANDARD SURVIVES BARBARA TECHS.
In a pre-Barbara Techs. ruling, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas in Hyewon Shin v. Allstate Texas Lloyds granted sum-
mary judgment for Allstate on plaintiff’s TPPCA claim, holding that
“under Texas law, ‘full and timely payment of an appraisal award under
the policy precludes an award of penalties under the Insurance Code’s
prompt payment provisions as a matter of law.’”185 On motion for recon-
sideration after Barbara Techs., the district court held that Barbara
Techs. “overruled the prior line of cases on the effect of appraisal awards,
at least as far as those opinions held that full and timely payment of an
appraisal award precludes TPPCA damages.”186
The Shin court asked the parties to brief the question of whether the
Mainali “reasonableness” exception, set out by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Mainali Corp. v. Covington Specialty Insurance
Co., survives Barbara Techs.187 In Mainali, the Fifth Circuit held that
there could be no violation of the TPPCA if an insurer’s pre-appraisal
payment was “reasonable.”188 While Shin argued that Barbara Techs.
overruled Mainali, the district court disagreed.189 The Shin court pointed
out that Barbara Techs. cited “Mainali with approval in support of the
claim that ‘when an insurer complies with the TPPCA in responding to
the claim, requesting necessary information, investigating, evaluating, and
reaching a decision on the claim, use of the contract’s appraisal process
does not vitiate the insurer’s earlier determination on the claim.’”190
The district court thus read Barbara Techs. “in conjunction with
Mainali as standing for the proposition that, in order for an insurer to
avoid a [TPPCA] claim . . . the insurer must have made a reasonable
preappraisal payment within the statutorily-provided period.”191 Because
Allstate made its preappraisal payment within the required time period,
the court was left to decide whether the pre-appraisal payment was rea-
sonable.192 Here, “the appraiser reached an award of $25,944.94, which
was 5.6 times greater than the initial preappraisal payment of
$4,616.63.”193 The court found the preappraisal amount reasonable be-
cause: (1) Allstate had complied with the procedural requirements set
forth in the TPPCA; and (2) “the difference between Allstate’s preap-
praisal and the appraisal payments [was] no larger than the difference in
other cases in which courts have made a similar reasonableness find-
185. See Hyewon Shin v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, No. 4:18-CV-01784, 2019 WL 4170259, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2019) (citing Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840, 847
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Mainali Corp. v. Covington Specialty Ins. Co., 872 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2017).
189. Shin, 2019 WL 4170259, at *1 (citing Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d at 823).
190. Id. (citing Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d at 823).
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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ing.”194 The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Allstate.195
D. WAIVER OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS
Texas courts favor “enforcing appraisal clauses ‘because denying the
appraisal would vitiate the insurer’s right to defend its breach of contract
claim.’”196 A party can, however, waive its rights to appraisal when (1) an
impasse has been reached; (2) “there was unreasonable delay between
the ‘point of impasse’ and the insured’s demand for appraisal; and (3) the
insurer shows it has been prejudiced by such delay.”197
In Miranda v. Texas Lloyds Allstate, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas addressed whether the insured had waived her
right to appraisal by unreasonably delaying invoking the appraisal provi-
sions thereby prejudicing the insurer.198 In a storm damage case, Miranda
requested appraisal more than three years after the date of loss and two
years after filing her original lawsuit.199 The district court rejected All-
state’s argument that the insured unreasonably delayed invoking ap-
praisal, noting that “[c]ourts measure delay from the point of impasse by
examining the parties’ conduct and surrounding circumstances. Such
measure goes beyond ‘the amount of time involved in seeking
appraisal.’”200
Miranda filed her claim with Allstate on March 30, 2017, and after All-
state “improperly denied/underpaid her claim,” filed suit on August 30,
2017.201 Miranda subsequently non-suited her claims and refiled her law-
suit against Allstate on April 3, 2019, alleging violations of the Texas In-
surance Code and breach of contract.202 The parties participated in an
unsuccessful mediation on September 5, 2019, and on September 9, 2019,
the insured invoked appraisal.203
Focusing on the point of “impasse,” the district court noted that
“[p]arties reach an impasse when there is ‘a mutual understanding that
neither will negotiate further’ and the parties are aware of the futility of
further negotiations.”204 The court found no indication that an impasse
194. Id. (referencing Hinojos v. State Farms Lloyd, 569 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2019, pet. filed)).
195. Id.; see also Lambert v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 02-17-00374-CV, 2019 WL 5792812,
at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, Nov. 7, 2019 pet. filed) (holding that (1) insured could not
recover extra-contractual damages after an appraisal award because the insured did not
allege actual damages different from what had already been paid under the policy; and (2)
because “the Lamberts’ TPPCA claims were ‘in the same procedural posture’” as those in
Barbara Techs., remand was proper for a determination of the liability issue).
196. Miranda v. Tex. Lloyds Allstate, No. 7:19-CV-146, 2019 WL 6208563, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 21, 2019) (citing In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404,
412 (Tex. 2011)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at *6
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *1.
202. Id. at *1–2.
203. Id. at *2.
204. Id. at *5.
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had occurred before the September 5, 2019 mediation, pointing out that
“Allstate’s participation in the . . . mediation further evidences the possi-
bility, rather than futility, of further negotiations.”205 Because the insured
invoked her right to appraisal four days after the mediation—the date of
impasse—there was no unreasonable delay.206
Agreeing with Miranda that “Allstate cannot establish prejudice by un-
reasonable delay where unreasonable delay did not occur,” the court
nonetheless went on to note that “even if unreasonable delay had oc-
curred, Defendant Allstate fail[ed] to otherwise prove prejudice.”207 The
district court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has stated “it is diffi-
cult to see how prejudice could ever be shown when the policy . . . gives
both sides the same opportunity to demand appraisal.”208 The district
court pointed out that, at any time during the claims process and the liti-
gation, during which Allstate was aware of the parties’ disagreement as to
the value of the claim, “Allstate equally had an opportunity to invoke its
right to appraisal.”209 The fact that Allstate continued on in the litigation
and expended time and effort without invoking its own right to appraisal
was insufficient to establish prejudice.210
VI. IMPROPER JOINDER
A. COURT REJECTS IMPROPER JOINDER CLAIM BECAUSE SOME
TEXAS COURTS HOLD THAT INDIVIDUALS CAN BE LIABLE
UNDER CHAPTER 541.060(A)(2)(A)
In Trejo v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas in San Antonio addressed
whether an insured’s addition of the claims adjuster as a defendant con-
stituted improper joinder for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.211 After
being involved in an accident, Velma Trejo filed a claim for UIM benefits
with Allstate which was denied.212 Trejo filed suit against Allstate and the
adjuster, Tonja Hess, asserting contractual and extra-contractual causes
of action, including that “Hess failed to attempt in good faith to effectu-
ate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of” the claim when liability
was “reasonably clear.”213 Allstate removed the lawsuit to federal court,
205. Id. at *6.
206. Id. at *7.
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 412
(Tex. 2011)); see also Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019) (rejecting
Ortiz’s argument that State Farm waived its appraisal right by invoking it after suit was
filed, the supreme court focused on point of impasse; the court noted that it has previously
“recognized the inherent difficulty of demonstrating prejudice when a policy allows both
parties the same opportunity to demand appraisal, opining that appraisal ‘could short-cir-
cuit potential litigation and should be pursued before resorting to the courts.’”).
209. Miranda, 2019 WL 6208563, at *7.
210. Id.
211. Trejo v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. SA-19-CV-00180-FB-ESC, 2019 WL
4545614, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2019).
212. Id. at *1.
213. Id. at *1, *5 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.060(a)(2)(A)).
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where Trejo argued lack of diversity because both Hess and Trejo are
Texas residents.214 Allstate argued improper joinder because Trejo’s com-
plaint failed to state a viable cause of action against Hess.215
The district court noted that “[b]oth the Fifth Circuit and the Texas
Supreme Court have held that an insurance adjuster may be individually
liable for violating Chapter 541,” but that “there is some uncertainty re-
garding which specific provisions of Chapter 541 expose an independent
adjuster to liability.”216 The district court recognized that Texas courts are
split regarding whether Chapter 541.060(a)(2)(A)217 applies only to in-
surers, and not to adjusters.218 Because some courts have held that ad-
justers can be liable under this section, the district court found that there
was “arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that state law might im-
pose liability,” and remand was proper.219
B. COURTS ADDRESS INSURER’S ELECTION TO ACCEPT AGENT’S
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 542A.006 AND IMPACT ON DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION: IT’S ALL ABOUT THE TIMING
On September 1, 2017, new provisions of the Texas Insurance Code
took effect, including Section 542A.006 which provides that “an insurer
that is a party to [a Chapter 542A] action may elect to accept whatever
liability an agent might have to the claimant for the agent’s acts or omis-
sions related to the claim by providing written notice to the claimant.”220
Once the election is made, “the court shall dismiss the action against the
agent with prejudice.”221 When the election is made pre-suit, “no cause of
action exists against the agent.”222 An insurer “may not revoke, and a
court may not nullify, an insurer’s election.”223 As the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas noted, the amendment spawned a
“novel question”: “if an out-of-state insurer is sued by a Texas insured,
and the insurer elects to accept liability for a non-diverse agent (thus re-
quiring the agent’s dismissal per Section 542A.006), may a federal court
disregard the non-diverse agent’s citizenship?”224 According to the dis-
trict court, “[t]he answer seems to be ‘maybe’ and ‘it depends.’”225
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *5.
217. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.060(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting an insurer from “failing to
attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim with
respect to which the insurer’s liability has become reasonably clear.”).
218. Trejo, 2019 WL 4545614, at *6.
219. Id.
220. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542A.006(a).
221. Id. § 542A.006(b)–(c).
222. Id. § 542A.006(b).
223. Id. § 542A.006(f).
224. See Bexar Diversified MF-1, LLC v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. SA-19-CV-00773-
XR, 2019 WL 6131455, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2019); see also Stephens v. SAFECO Ins.
Co. of Ind., No. 4:18-cv-00595, 2019 WL 109395, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2019) (noting that
the amendment spawned a “novel question regarding removal based on diversity of
citizenship”).
225. Bexar, 2019 WL 6131455, at *3.
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All courts to address the issue agree “that when an insurer makes its
election before an insured files suit, no cause of action exists against the
agent, and if the insured later names the agent as a non-diverse defendant
the court may disregard that agent’s citizenship for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.”226
There is a split of authority, however, over the issue of improper join-
der “when an insurer elects to accept liability at any time after the insured
files suit.”227 In Bexar Diversified MF-1, LLC v. General Star Indemnity
Co.,228 the insurer made its election in its Notice of Removal.229 The dis-
trict court noted that it and two other Texas courts had “previously found
a non-diverse defendant to be improperly joined following an insurer’s
post-suit election.”230 These courts reasoned that because “there is no
reasonable basis to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover
against the agent” in state court, a finding of improper joinder was
proper.231
The Bexar court pointed out that “other federal district courts in Texas
have disagreed,” focusing on whether the joinder was proper at the time
the suit was filed.232 The Bexar court however, held that the focus should
be on whether, at the time of removal, the “election establishes the impos-
sibility of recovery against the non-diverse defendant in state court”; if
the answer is “no,” the joinder was improper.233 Because the insurer’s
election at the time of removal required dismissal of the claims against
the agent, the agent’s citizenship was disregarded for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction.234
In Kotzur v. Metropolitan Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas distinguished Bexar from the
case before it on the basis that the insurer in Kotzur waited until thirty
days after removal to file its election.235 The district court held that a
post-removal election, while it “may have the effect of dismissing the
non-diverse defendants in state court,” does not support a finding of im-
proper joinder “because the ‘jurisdictional facts that support removal
must be judged at the time of the removal.’”236 Because, at the time of
removal, the district court could not say there was no reasonable basis to
predict that plaintiffs might be able to recover against the agents on the
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *1.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id.
232. Id. (citing Flores v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co. Co., No. SA-18-CV-742-XR,
2018 WL 5695553, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018) (denying remand)).
233. Id. at *4.
234. Id. at *5.
235. Kotzur v. Metro. Lloyds Ins. Co., No. SA-19-CV-01165-XR, 2019 WL 6168207, at
*4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2019).
236. Id. at *4 n.3. (citing Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
2000)).
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insureds’ claims, the district court held that remand was proper.237
237. Id. at *5.
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